The December 2019 Sudanese revolution marked a turning point in modern Sudanese history, as it ousted the ousted president Omar al-Bashir, who ruled the country with an iron fist for more than three decades.
Despite its massive success and the powerful message delivered by the revolutionaries—astonishing the world with the peaceful nature of a revolution that shook the thrones of some of Africa’s strongest dictatorships—the revolution did not follow the expected path toward genuine democratic transformation.
“Mashawir” spoke with several groups and individuals closely tied to the revolution—politicians, analysts, revolutionaries, and Kandakas (female revolutionaries)—to answer this critical question:
Did the December Revolution really get lost? Who lost it? How and why?
Circumventing the Revolution
Hisham Abu Rida, a leader of the Broad National Front, began by saying:
“We, from inside the sit-in square, called on the revolutionary forces to declare their own government, because the sit-in represented the parliament of the revolution. This advice came from the late leader Ali Mahmoud Hassanein, a man with long political and revolutionary experience in Sudan. Unfortunately, the revolution was lost in exactly the way he feared.”
He added:
“Hassanein urged the revolutionary forces to submit a letter to the military council demanding the immediate handover of power to civilians—without negotiations or sitting at the table—to avoid delays that would derail the revolution. That is precisely what happened.”
Abu Rida explained:
“Following those steps, the Islamists hijacked the revolution. In the Broad National Front, we consider the hijacking began as early as April 11, 2019, during the statement by Jaafar Ibn Auf. That’s when the counter-revolution started. The Security Committee, along with the political forces that are always chasing positions—the soft landing group and political compromise faction—succeeded in turning this great revolution into a safe landing for the Islamists.”
He continued:
“The betrayal of the revolution was evident from the moment the Declaration of the Forces of Freedom and Change was issued in January 2019. We in the Broad National Front criticized it, particularly due to the absence of legal accountability and justice. The so-called ‘soft landing’ group was originally in the background, but when the revolution succeeded, they rushed to the frontlines and assumed leadership positions, aiding in the betrayal of the revolution.”
Soft Landing
Hisham Abu Rida continued:
“There were factions within the Forces of Freedom and Change with different agendas. But it was the soft landing group that succeeded in weakening the revolutionary momentum. When Abdalla Hamdok became Prime Minister, Salah Manna mentioned that he and Salah Gosh had gone together to Addis Ababa to convince Hamdok to accept the position. This step proves that the hands of the Islamists were at play in undermining the revolution. Still, the revolutionary momentum was always stronger than the betrayal by political forces.”
“In the end, when the Islamists failed to suppress the revolution, they launched this systematic war. We in the Broad National Front fully understand the danger of the Islamists and their level of organization. They created militias such as the Rapid Support Forces, which emerged from their regime. With this war—this theatrical performance—they tried to regain sympathy from the Sudanese people, especially amid widespread ignorance of the Islamists’ plans. Tragically, many intellectuals who once stood against this regime have now become its mouthpieces, defending this war and calling it a ‘dignity war.’”
“They managed to convince the public that the southern war was a jihad, and when millions died, Hassan al-Turabi came out and said those people were not martyrs, they were ‘dead in vain.’”
Abu Rida added:
“This is the Islamists’ nature. But despite this, we remain hopeful. We know that no matter how much the Islamists try to hijack the revolution, they will not succeed. The people are aware, and whenever the Islamists try to throw a stone into the water of this revolution, it only burns brighter. They can prolong this war, but they will not succeed in reproducing themselves in Sudanese political life. They have said many times that they won’t leave power, even if it means the end of Sudan. But the people’s will is stronger than that.”
The People’s Will is Stronger
Abu Rida continued:
“The Islamists, with all their militias—be they Janjaweed or the new ones like Kata’ib al-Baraa and al-Barq al-Khatif—are trying to take over the state and its institutions. But the people’s will is stronger.”
“The Janjaweed militias are run by Islamists like Hasbu Mohammed Abdulrahman, and many Islamist leaders have deeply infiltrated these militias. They work in harmony with the army leadership, which has been ideologically influenced since the 1990s. Since then, admission to the military college has depended on favoritism and recommendations from Islamists, so the upper leadership is more loyal to the Islamists than to the people or the army. But we are confident that this army will soon be liberated from Islamist control. These militias will be dismantled, foreign fighters expelled, and all perpetrators held accountable. These crimes do not fall under a statute of limitations.”
Restructuring the Armed Forces
Abu Rida added:
“We in the Broad National Front have drafted several laws:
a law to combat corruption (financial, media, and political),
a transitional constitution,
a law for political isolation,
a constitutional court law,
a law to restructure the armed forces,
and a law to restructure the judiciary and political parties to prevent sectarian control.
But none of these laws were implemented because everyone was vying for power.”
Swift Justice
Abu Rida noted that:
“A group within the Forces of Freedom and Change worked against the Broad National Front’s project. The laws exist and are ready to fill any vacuum. They ensure swift and fair trials—not arbitrary ones. We will not behave like the Islamists. A member of the old regime will not be prosecuted merely for affiliation, but for actual crimes. This lays the foundation for the rule of law and a civil state.”
A Deferred Battle
He continued:
“We don’t want to get into details about what the other political forces did to weaken this great revolution, because the Sudanese people will hold accountable everyone responsible for its derailment. It’s a battle—but a deferred one for now.”
He added:
“When the Islamists realized how dangerous the revolutionary momentum was, they ignited this war, which is still ongoing. But it has not achieved their goals or changed the people’s convictions. The revolution will remain alive until this regime is fully uprooted.”
Internal Conspiracy
Amani Abu Idris, a leader in the Baath Party and women’s rights activist, said:
“December didn’t fully become a revolution. It was more of a revolutionary uprising. It wasn’t lost entirely, but it’s currently going through a difficult phase due to internal and external conspiracies, and the political and organizational weakness of the revolutionary movement.”
She added:
“Still, the spark of awareness that December ignited remains alive—especially among the youth. History shows that revolutions are born more than once. This painful experience may be a necessary step toward building deeper political and social awareness.”
Counter-Revolution
Abu Idris continued:
“One of the biggest reasons for the revolution’s setbacks was the emergence of a counter-revolution—led by the deep state, former regime elements, security and military institutions (including the military council), the Rapid Support Forces, and even some political forces and armed movements that were once seen as part of the revolution.”
“The revolutionary spirit among the youth outpaced the political awareness needed to protect it. There was also a lack of organization after al-Bashir’s fall, and divisions within the Forces of Freedom and Change and Resistance Committees. This all led to the October 25, 2021 coup and eventually to the current war.”
The Banana Sit-in
University professor Tamador Al-Tayeb stated:
“Everyone contributed to the loss of the December Revolution. There were people who trusted the army—I was one of them, and so was Hamdok. Many of us believed the military would honor the agreement and hand over power to civilians within the agreed timeframe.”
She added:
“That trust in the military was one of our biggest mistakes. Another group didn’t trust the army and believed a coup was inevitable before civilians
could take power—and they were right.”
Al-Tayeb continued:
“There was also another group that saw the revolution as an opportunity for personal gain. A clear example is the ‘Banana Sit-in’ group that supported the military’s coup against the transitional civilian government.”
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